Svensk internetövervakning är på diktaturnivå och spelet bakom kulisserna angående övervakningen sköts ungefär på samma sätt som i diktaturerna...
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- Svaret finns kanske delvis i videon...
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* “Forced to operate under strict data storage and protection laws for Swedish citizens, they [FRA] are concerned that the public may perceive their involvement as an attempt to work around these restrictions by using a foreign intermediary (the United States), thus poisoning any chance for success,” US State Department cable (UNCLAS Stockholm 000704) goes on. **
* UNCLAS STOCKHOLM 000704 SIPDIS STATE FOR CA/P/IP BARBARA HALL, PETER THOMPSON, DIANE BEAN AND MARY DOETSCH SENSITIVE E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: CVIS [Visas], PREL [External Political Relations], PM [Panama], SW [Sweden] SUBJECT: SWEDISH SCENESETTER FOR HSPD-6 NEGOTIATING TEAM VISIT REF: (A) STOCKHOLM 450 (B) STOCKHOLM 510
* ¶1. (SBU) Embassy Stockholm welcomes Peter Thompson, Mary Doetsch, Zandra Flemister, and Wynne Teel, October 22-24. We believe, based on MOJ contacts and our political analysis, that the proposed exchange of terrorist screening information is going to be a very hard sell. We should make clear to the Swedes the potential consequences of not reaching an agreement, so that they can accurately assess the issue.
* ¶2. (SBU) The recently passed surveillance legislation, describer in reftels and locally referred to as the "FRA-law" after the implementing agency, the National Defense Radio Establishment (Frsvarets Radioanstalt), has been very controversial. The law would expand the use of warrantless wiretapping and other surveillance techniques, and is generally considered a big political mistake here in Sweden. With two years to go before the next national election, the government wants to avoid a similar incident and is in the process of significantly modifying the recently passed law to include authorization requirements and oversight by a special court.
* ¶3. (SBU) The MOJ will have the leading role in concluding any agreement on information exchange. Working level law enforcement counterparts (all under the MOJ) such as the Swedish Security Services (SAPO) have been warned internally to refrain from participating in any discussions on this issue until it has policy level approval. Forced to operate under strict data storage and protection laws for Swedish citizens, they are concerned that the public may perceive their involvement as an attempt to work around these restrictions by using a foreign intermediary (the United States), thus poisoning any chance for success. They have also indicated that they feel current working level exchanges of data work well and that an HSPD-6 agreement will add little substantive value.
* ¶4. (SBU) The initial MOJ response to a review of the proposed exchange text was that they were uncertain as to whether it fell under an EU competency, or could be concluded bilaterally. If they do proceed bilaterally, the agreement may have to be presented to Parliament under a vague constitutional requirement for "matters of great importance. " If so, the process will take considerably longer and be subject to public scrutiny, something the GOS will want to avoid. As the MOJ continues to analyze the proposed text, it is also considering how to craft an arrangement that will avoid the need for parliamentary review. As a result of this uncertainty, they see your October 23 meeting as an opportunity to seek precise details on the type of information the United States wants and overall aim of the agreement, e.g. continued Visa Waiver Program participation or fixing a gap in current information exchange systems. * FOUR RELEVANT SWEDISH LAWS *
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* ¶5. (SBU) There are four Swedish laws that may touch upon HSPD-6 negotiations: the Secrecy Act (SFS 1992:1474), the Police Act (SFS 1984:387), the Police Data Act (SFS 1998:622), and the Personal Data Act (SFS 1998:204). The Swedish Secrecy Act enumerates the exceptions to the general principle of public access to all official government documents and activities. The Swedish Police Act regulates police powers of search, arrest, detention and the use of force. The Police Data Act regulates the police (including SAPO) use and storage of personal data during and after investigations. The Personal Data Act brings Swedish privacy law into conformity with the requirements of the European Union (EU) Data Protection Directive (95/46/EC) by essentially incorporates the EU Data Protection Directive into Swedish law. It aims to prevent the violation of personal integrity by the processing of personal data, both automatically (electronically) and manually.
WOOD *
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Secret Swedish Spy Law, US connection exposed by WikiLeaks cables
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Laddades upp den 11 feb. 2011
As
Sweden battles for the extradition of Julian Assange, Wikileaks cables
on the country's close cooperation with the U.S. are provoking a public
backlash. The text revealed Washington's push to influence Swedish
wiretapping laws so communication passing through the Scandinavian
country can be intercepted.
En video från RT som först publicerades 2011-02-11.
- Varför spionerar våra myndigheter på oss på samma sätt som de gör i de värsta diktaturerna?
- Svaret finns kanske delvis i videon...
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Ett alternativt svar som också är 100% trovärdigt ser du här ovanför... ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
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The Swedish intelligence service, the FRA, has the power to monitor and intercept all internet traffic in the country. And thanks to leaked US State Department cables, we now know the controversial law was adopted after pressure from Washington. And the security services were deliberately kept out of the process to reassure Swedes there was no “funny business”. *****
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* “Forced to operate under strict data storage and protection laws for Swedish citizens, they [FRA] are concerned that the public may perceive their involvement as an attempt to work around these restrictions by using a foreign intermediary (the United States), thus poisoning any chance for success,” US State Department cable (UNCLAS Stockholm 000704) goes on. **
http://rt.com/news/sweden-us-information-swedish/
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* UNCLAS Stockholm 000704 *** *
* UNCLAS STOCKHOLM 000704 SIPDIS STATE FOR CA/P/IP BARBARA HALL, PETER THOMPSON, DIANE BEAN AND MARY DOETSCH SENSITIVE E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: CVIS [Visas], PREL [External Political Relations], PM [Panama], SW [Sweden] SUBJECT: SWEDISH SCENESETTER FOR HSPD-6 NEGOTIATING TEAM VISIT REF: (A) STOCKHOLM 450 (B) STOCKHOLM 510
* ¶1. (SBU) Embassy Stockholm welcomes Peter Thompson, Mary Doetsch, Zandra Flemister, and Wynne Teel, October 22-24. We believe, based on MOJ contacts and our political analysis, that the proposed exchange of terrorist screening information is going to be a very hard sell. We should make clear to the Swedes the potential consequences of not reaching an agreement, so that they can accurately assess the issue.
* ¶2. (SBU) The recently passed surveillance legislation, describer in reftels and locally referred to as the "FRA-law" after the implementing agency, the National Defense Radio Establishment (Frsvarets Radioanstalt), has been very controversial. The law would expand the use of warrantless wiretapping and other surveillance techniques, and is generally considered a big political mistake here in Sweden. With two years to go before the next national election, the government wants to avoid a similar incident and is in the process of significantly modifying the recently passed law to include authorization requirements and oversight by a special court.
* ¶3. (SBU) The MOJ will have the leading role in concluding any agreement on information exchange. Working level law enforcement counterparts (all under the MOJ) such as the Swedish Security Services (SAPO) have been warned internally to refrain from participating in any discussions on this issue until it has policy level approval. Forced to operate under strict data storage and protection laws for Swedish citizens, they are concerned that the public may perceive their involvement as an attempt to work around these restrictions by using a foreign intermediary (the United States), thus poisoning any chance for success. They have also indicated that they feel current working level exchanges of data work well and that an HSPD-6 agreement will add little substantive value.
* ¶4. (SBU) The initial MOJ response to a review of the proposed exchange text was that they were uncertain as to whether it fell under an EU competency, or could be concluded bilaterally. If they do proceed bilaterally, the agreement may have to be presented to Parliament under a vague constitutional requirement for "matters of great importance. " If so, the process will take considerably longer and be subject to public scrutiny, something the GOS will want to avoid. As the MOJ continues to analyze the proposed text, it is also considering how to craft an arrangement that will avoid the need for parliamentary review. As a result of this uncertainty, they see your October 23 meeting as an opportunity to seek precise details on the type of information the United States wants and overall aim of the agreement, e.g. continued Visa Waiver Program participation or fixing a gap in current information exchange systems. * FOUR RELEVANT SWEDISH LAWS *
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* ¶5. (SBU) There are four Swedish laws that may touch upon HSPD-6 negotiations: the Secrecy Act (SFS 1992:1474), the Police Act (SFS 1984:387), the Police Data Act (SFS 1998:622), and the Personal Data Act (SFS 1998:204). The Swedish Secrecy Act enumerates the exceptions to the general principle of public access to all official government documents and activities. The Swedish Police Act regulates police powers of search, arrest, detention and the use of force. The Police Data Act regulates the police (including SAPO) use and storage of personal data during and after investigations. The Personal Data Act brings Swedish privacy law into conformity with the requirements of the European Union (EU) Data Protection Directive (95/46/EC) by essentially incorporates the EU Data Protection Directive into Swedish law. It aims to prevent the violation of personal integrity by the processing of personal data, both automatically (electronically) and manually.
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* Reference id | aka Wikileaks id #174576 |
Subject | Swedish Scenesetter For Hspd-6 Negotiating Team Visit |
Origin | Embassy Stockholm (Sweden) |
Cable time | Tue, 21 Oct 2008 12:48 UTC |
Classification | UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY |
Source | http://wikileaks.org/cable/2008/10/08STOCKHOLM704.html |
References | 08STOCKHOLM510 |
Referenced by | 08STOCKHOLM748 |
History |
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De hemliga telegrammen - WikiLeaks - Sverige och USA dokument inifrån SVT
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Publicerades den 13 aug. 2013 figaropravda
What did Cablegate teach us about relations between Sweden and the United States? Swedish documentary from 2010. English subtitles.
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FRA vet folket vad det är och det kriticeras.
SvaraRaderaSRA vet ingen vad det är för vi agerar i det dolda.
SVENSKA REPUBLIKANSKA ARMEN....
Nu vet vi!
RaderaAtt svensk internettövervakning sköts som om det vore en diktatur !
SvaraRaderaSverige är faktiskt en halv diktatur med en utanpåliggande demokrati för syns skull.
Det blir bara tjafs i demokratin då dom bara har halva makten samtidigt som dom värkar vara helt ansvarsbefriade.
Diktaturen bakom är våran kunggörelse med lagen militären och polis med rättsväsendet.
Och det är den svenska militären som spanar medan dom inte står för sitt spanande.
Och då är frågan vad som är militär och vad som är polis ?
För i sverige ser vi inte skillnad på militär och cevilt vilket man värkligen gör i andra länder.
Sverige har underättelsetjänst samtidigt som sverige förnekar spioneri.
Ett skitsofrent land som förnekar sig självt.
För vi har en lag om yttrandefrihet och vi har rätten att vara anonym när vi går ut i media medan dom som är anonyma är det värkliga hotet.
För det är det fria ordet som är fara för våran kungörelse och våran demokrati då det är politikerna som har ensamrätt i media då media styrs.
Politiker som inte är folkvalda utan valda bakom redåerna på partikongresser.
Kan man blanda i hop ett stadssystem mera !
Termen "demokratur" fungerar också ganska bra.
RaderaDessvärre vill de flesta inte veta hur det ligger till - inte tills de själva drabbats av effekterna.
*Videos på sidan som tagits bort från Youtube är nu uppe igen (ett tag?)